The paper investigates a model where two parties A and B invest sequentially in a joint project (an asset). Investments and the asset value are nonverifiable, and A is wealth constrained so that an initial outlay must be financed by either agent B or an external investor C (a bank). We show that an option contract in combination with a loan arrangement facilitates first best investments and any arbitrary distribution of surplus if renegotiation is infeasible.
Introduction
Parties in an economic relationship often invest sequentially to enhance the value of a joint project. In a research joint venture between a large pharmaceutical company and a specialized biotechnology firm, the research unit is responsible for the early-stage development of a new product, while the subsequent manufacturing and sales tasks are assigned to the downstream company. Similarly, in high tech start-ups, the creativity and devotion of a founder is decisive for the firm's success in its early stages, while the skills of an experienced management team ( often brought in by a venture capitalist) becomes crucial in later periods. Typically, the investments of both partners are complex and hard to describe or contract upon. Therefore, the question arises of how to design a governance structure which assigns optimal investments incentives in an indirect manner. The literature has shown that -in contrast to straight or non-conditional ownership structures -option contracts may be best suited to attain this goal. Demski and Sappington (1991) were among the first to consider an agency model with sequential investments.
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They show that if agent B (who invests subsequently) holds an option to sell the asset to agent A (who invests first) after both parties invested, both parties can be led to exert efficient effort and the first best is attained. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) extend this result to a setting where the agents can renegotiate their initial arrangement. They find that an option-to-own contract which grants B the right to buy the asset after both parties invested implements the first best. Moreover, renegotiation does not arise on the equilibrium path, and the first best often remains feasible in a stochastic environment where the asset value is subject to uncertainty.
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The present paper reconsiders this double moral hazard framework with sequential investments for a situation where agent A is wealth constrained. Then, two intertwined issues emerge that are well known from the corporate finance literature: First, who should finance an initial outlay that may be necessary to launch the relationship?
1 For a recent survey on research alliances, see Hagedoorn et al. (2000) . Sahlman (1990) provides a thorough assessment of venture capital financing.
2 See also Banerjee and Beggs (1989) who, however, focus on a specific production technology.
3 Edlin and Hermalin (2000) consider a framework where party A is risk-averse, and focus on optionto-buy contracts with an exercise date after the first agent -but before the second agent -invested. For the special case of risk-neutral parties, their results imply that efficiency can then be attained if and only if the parties' investments are substitutive on the margin.
Second, how can the surplus from the relationship be distributed among the parties involved? Both questions seem relevant in a variety of economic situations where sequential investments play role. In biotechnology joint ventures, the small research firm often does not have the monetary endowment to finance the high-tech equipment necessary to conduct its research. Likewise, start-up firms often enter a relationship with a venture capital fund in order to obtain a seed financing. In these and other situations, it is interesting to ask whether wealth constraints interfere with incentive considerations, and which mode of financing generates optimal incentives. We investigate two basic possibilities. First, partner B may provide the necessary monetary resources (which we label 'internal financing'). Second, A and B can bring in an third party (a bank, say) to raise the initial outlay ('external financing').
A broad theme of the corporate finance literature is that limited liability may have an adverse impact on the outcome of economic relationships. In the present setting, however, we find that financing constraints are in fact irrelevant if renegotiation can be prevented. Internal as well as external financing implements the first best, and the optimal initial contract is a two-part arrangement: it consists of (a) a loan given by either agent B or an outside party C, and (b) an option-to-buy contract between A and B. Specifically, the optimal arrangement under internal financing resembles a convertible debt contract under which B can choose whether to insist on a repayment, or to exercise her option instead.
4
We also show that, under internal as well as external financing, any arbitrary distribution of surplus is compatible with the efficiency goal.
Hence, each point along the Pareto frontier can be reached and distributional issues impose no constraint on the optimal solution.
Despite this congruence in results, we also find that that the optimal strike price of B's option crucially depends on the mode of financing. In case of an external investor, the efficient option price makes agent B in equilibrium just indifferent between investing and exercising her option or not, and is shown to be the same as in a model where wealth constraints are absent. Conversely, under internal financing, the optimal option price is ceteris paribus, i.e., for a given distribution of joint surplus, larger than under 4 In our model, party B acquires the entire equity as is frequently observed in research joint ventures.
According to Arora and Gambardella (1990) , for example, many indicators suggest that biotechnology firms are often founded with the intent of later on being sold to a large corporation. In an empirical study on joint ventures, Bleeke and Ernst (1995) find that one partner buys out the other in almost 80% of their sample.
external financing. At first sight, this result is counterintuitive because B then strictly prefers a debt repayment over her conversion option when A invests efficiently. This puzzle is resolved by observing that, when agent A is wealth constrained, B can in many situations not credibly insist on a repayment when she forgoes own effort because the asset value is then smaller than her repayment claim. To enforce a debt repayment, B must then undertake some positive threshold effort which increases the asset value but reduces her payoff relative to a situation where A has a cash endowment. At a strike price which is optimal under external financing, B thus has a strict preference to exercise even if A underinvests, which leads A to defect. As a remedy, the strike price must be raised to a level where B is in equilibrium just indifferent between a repayment minus the accompanied default effort on the one hand, and efficient investments and debt conversion on the other.
We then consider a scenario where renegotiation is admitted. Now, the financing constraint may have allocative consequences and preclude an efficient outcome of the relationship. In particular, A may have an incentive to underinvest for strategic reasons in order to extract a larger portion of the surplus. Notably, this problem also appears when A has all the bargaining power ex ante so that the contractual arrangement allows him to appropriate the entire surplus from the relationship. Intuitively, if A underinvests, renegotiation becomes necessary in order to induce B to expend the conditionally efficient effort level. If the initial outlay is positive and/or if the initial contract promises B or C a large fraction of social surplus, a defection allows A to default on these claims. Then, A finds a defection indeed optimal if he is in a sufficiently strong bargaining position, and appropriates a large share of the bargaining surplus.
The efficiency properties of internal and external financing differ in a setting with renegotiation. In general, internal financing dominates when A's bargaining power in renegotiations with B and C (which arises after a deviation under external financing)
is not significantly smaller than in bilateral bargaining with only agent B (which arises under internal financing). Otherwise, however, bank financing renders it easier to mitigate the underinvestment problem so that there may be an efficiency-improving role for third parties. Finally, we argue that a combination of multiple lenders (B and C) may be optimal if the first best cannot be attained in a arrangement with a single lender. In particular, multiple lenders combine the advantages of internal and external financing: while the lender's default payoff under internal financing is larger (because B will invest to increase this default payoff) which reduces the renegotiation surplus for party A, external financing may reduce A's strength in renegotiations because he now faces two opponents.
Our results contribute to earlier findings on the optimal governance and financial structure of a wealth-constrained firm. Among others, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995) consider models where the asset (the firm) exists for two periods, in which the firm owner can expend noncontractible productive investments. At the end of each period, a non-verifiable cash flow is realized. If renegotiation is infeasible, the optimal debt contract gives the investor the right to liquidate (part of) the asset after the firm's default on repayments after the first period. While this liquidation is inefficient, it reduces the firm's incentives to default strategically. Berglöf and von Thadden (1994) , Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) show that, if renegotiation is feasible, the optimal capital structure calls for a combination of long-term and short term investors with claims of different priority. In line with our results, the presence of multiple investors may reduce the firm's anticipated renegotiation gain after a default, which renders it less attractive to defect on a repayment obligation on short-term debt. The present paper thus draws on these previous contributions, but is also differs from them in several respects. Most importantly, we assume that two parties rather than one have to expend non-contractible investments which makes it efficient to change ownership titles during the course of the relationship.
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Also, we consider a situation where the asset value materializes only at the end of the game, implying that repayment decisions cannot impose a shutdown threat on the firm owner. Despite these differences, we also find that the optimal contractual arrangement may resemble financing schemes that are observed in reality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework.
In Section 3, we analyze the model for the case where renegotiation is infeasible, while Section 4 considers renegotiation. Section 5 contains some brief concluding remarks.
5 In independent work, Schmidt (2000) analyzes a similar model where a wealth constrained startup entrepreneur E and a venture capitalist V C expend sequential investments. His model confines attention to the case of internal financing and (in contrast to the other papers in the literature) assumes the asset value to be verifiable which renders shared-equity arrangements feasible. Finally, V C can only undertake a binary rather than a continuous effort after E invested. Disregarding the possibility of strategic default which is the focus of the present paper, it is shown that convertible debt facilitates the first best in a variety of situations.
The Model
We consider a model with two risk-neutral agents A and B who start a relationship and sequentially invest into an asset. At date 0, the partners sign an initial contract, and a monetary seed investment K ≥ 0 has to be incurred. At date 1, party A can expend an idiosyncratic investment (which will be referred to as effort) a ∈ R + 0 . At date 2, the initial contract may be renegotiated, before agent B undertakes her own effort b ∈ R + 0 at date 3. Both investments are in physical capital so that the asset value neither depends on its final owner nor on the further engagement of either party. The asset value v(a, b) materializes at date 4, and the game ends at date 5 where repayments are made, options may be exercised, and final payoffs are realized. 
According to part a), the joint project has a non-negative gross value for any feasible combination (a, b) . If neither party expends effort, this value is normalized to zero. Part b) ensures that some positive but finite investment levels are optimal provided the project should be started. Finally, part c) states that investments are (weak) complements at the margin. We thus focus on the natural case where the return on, e.g., basic research is small if not combined with complementary skills such as production experience and marketing know-how, and vice versa. For subsequent reference, we compute the first-best investments (a ) which maximize the ex-ante surplus,
Throughout, we suppose that the relationship should be started, i.e., v(a . Notice that B will expend b * (a) when she anticipates to be asset owner and therefore residual claimant for the return from her own effort at date 5.
After A invested, the parties may find it useful to rescind their initial contractual arrangement and write a new one. For convenience and in line with the literature, we suppose that the outcome of these renegotiations is described by the generalized Nashbargaining solution. When renegotiations occur at date 2, the agents therefore share the efficiency gain above their respective default payoffs according to a linear sharing rule.
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We parameterize A's bargaining strength in bilateral renegotiations with B by γ ∈ [0, 1], while B has a relative bargaining power (1 − γ).
6 As mentioned in the Introduction, this assumption implies that option contracts with an exercise date before B invested (i.e., at date 2) do not implement the first best even if limited liability is disregarded [see Edlin and Hermalin (2000) ]. Most of our subsequent results extend to the case of substitutive investments as well. See the discussion in footnote 14 below. 7 This efficiency gain is the difference between the maximal joint continuation surplusŜ(a, b * (a)), and the sum of the default payoffs.
As a useful starting point of analysis, let us first consider a situation where A is not wealth-constrained and finances the initial outlay K out of own funds. Suppose that A is asset owner at date 0 and A and B do not sign an initial contract.
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After A invested a at date 1, B will at date 3 undertake the conditionally efficient investment b * (a) only if she anticipates to become residual claimant. Hence, the parties will (if feasible) renegotiate the initial governance structure at date 2 where B buys the asset.
Since B will clearly not invest when A retains ownership, A's default payoff at the renegotiation date 2 is given as v(a, 0). Accordingly, and presuming it is efficient to start the project, his maximization program at date 1 reads
and the unique equilibrium effortâ is determined by the first-order condition
This condition immediately reveals thatâ < a
when investments are complemen-
Only if investments are marginally independent, A invests efficiently and non-conditional ownership attains the first best provided renegotiation is feasible. In the next sections, we analyze option contracts and ask whether this contingent governance structure can overcome the inefficient outcome under non-contingent ownership. Thereby, we disregard the possibility of renegotiation in Section 3, while renegotiation is taken into account in the subsequent Section 4.
Equilibrium Analysis
In related papers, Demski and Sappington (1991) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) have shown that option contracts generically facilitate an efficient outcome. These models suppose that both parties possess a sufficiently large monetary endowment and, consequently, limited liability is no matter of concern. Also, no monetary outlay is required at the start of the relationship. As we will see in subsection 3.1 below, an efficient outcome remains feasible if a seed investment is needed but A is not wealth constrained. After analyzing this benchmark, we incorporate a wealth constraint on 8 Notice that A will not expend any effort when B initially owns the asset. 9 Similarly, if investments are substitutive, we haveâ > a F B .
A's side who then cannot finance K, and also cannot assure B's participation in the venture by providing an upfront payment. Subsection 3.2 considers a situation where B finances the asset start up. Subsequently, in subsection 3.3, we examine external financing by a bank C which has no further productive role.
Wealthy Agents
Suppose A (a) and exercises her option-to-buy at date 5 because her associated continuation
at least weakly exceeds R. Therefore, A will never invest
because B reaps the return on any excess effort. We must also show that A will not invest less than a
. Then, B refrains from any investment and insists on the repayment R at date 5 because ) between both parties.
We can state the following proposition which is an extension of results found in Demski and Sappington (1991) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998 by an amount R = K leaves the equilibrium payoffs of both parties unaffected, and does not distort their incentives to expend value-enhancing effort.
Financing Constraints
We now explore whether the implementation result of Proposition 1 carries over to a setting where A is wealth constrained, which seems relevant in many real-life situa- can only hurt A and is thus self defeating.
quences whether or not wealth constraints are admitted. Therefore, we can without loss of generality focus on option-to-buy contracts to shorten the exposition.
If A is wealth-constrained, however, B's default strategy b = 0 after observing a < a F B may no longer be optimal. To see this, consider R ≥ L = K and A expends an effort so small that v(a, 0) < R. Notice that effort levels with this property exist for any K > 0 by Assumption 1.
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Then, A has to default on repayment R when B exerts no effort, and B has a legal claim on the asset and becomes owner at date 5. However, if
A goes indeed bankrupt and B seizes the collateral, b = 0 cannot be her best response on A's defective action. It is now useful to state the following definition.
The threshold investmentb(a, R) represents the minimal effort which B must expend for given a to enforce the repayment R. 
11 They also exist if B has to be promised a positive share of total surplus, i.e., if R > 0 even if
12 Throughout the main text, we will without loss of generality concentrate on loan levels L = K.
For L > K where the initial loan exceeds the seed investment, A retains a monetary endowment L − K. Hence, he can repay his debt for given (a, b) whenever (L − K) + v(a, b) ≥ R. In order to leave B's equilibrium surplus unaffected, an increase in L must be accompanied by an identical increase in R. Accordingly, the threshold investmentb(a, L, R(L)) does not vary in L for any given distribution of total surplus. All proofs in the Appendix allow for loan levels L > K, so thatb(·) is there defined
and notice that this condition holds (at least) for deviations a close to a and R, this latter condition translates into
We can now state the following preliminary result. and observe thatb(a, R) < b * (a) for
, the left-hand side of (C2) converges to zero whileb(a, R)
converges to a strictly positive value for any R ≥ K. Accordingly, an option contract with strike price p * does not implement efficient investments.
We now show that a modified option price may nevertheless facilitate an efficient outcome of the relationship. Specifically, consider the strike price
, R). 
By construction of p * * , this condition is satisfied with equality for a = a . Second, we must show that B will not exercise her option for any a < a 14 In contrast to the framework where A has a monetary endowment, though, the optimal option price may be one which does not make party B indifferent between exercising her option on the one hand, and to claim a repayment on the other. Rather, the option price may be so large that she has strict preferences for a repayment but anticipates that an enforcement of this claim will require costly effort.
External Financing
We now suppose that A does not rely on B to finance the initial outlay, i.e., L = 0.
Instead, he signs a debt contract with an external investor C (e.g., a bank) which at While an inefficient outcome may possibly arise for substitutive investments, I was unable to construct an example where this is actually the case. Edlin and Hermalin (2000) have shown that, if wealth constraints are disregarded, an option contract with exercise date 2 facilitates the first best if (and only if) investments are substitutive on the margin. Hence, in order to prove that an option contract can trigger an inefficient outcome under internal financing with substitutive investments, one would also have to check this alternative type of contractual arrangement which is outside the scope of the present work. We should note that -with the exceptions of Proposition 2 and Proposition 4(b) below -all results in the present paper also hold in situations where investments are strict substitutes. The logic behind this proposition is simple. If B does not finance the initial outlay, she is not locked into the relationship before expending own investments. Therefore, A cannot exploit his limited liability to hold up B and to force her to invest in order to protect her repayment claims after A defected. Relying on an external investor prevents hold up exactly because this investor has no productive role. In addition, the initial arrangement can assign parties B and C any arbitrary share of the joint surplus. To see this, consider a contract extension under which B receives from C an unconditional fixed payment, say T . Clearly, the size of this lump sum transfer has no effect on efficiency and the parties' equilibrium rents are U
5, and
A simple contractual arrangement among A, B and an external investor C thus implements the first best if renegotiation is infeasible.
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While this outcome replicates the implementation result under internal financing, the construction of the optimal strike price of B's option differs across regimes. In particular, and in contrast to internal financing, the optimal strike price now exactly coincides with the one in a model where limited liability and financing issues do not arise. Consequently, when external investors are admitted and renegotiation can be prevented, there is no loss of generality in confining attention to an option-to-buy contract with strike price p *
15 Notice that external financing generically implements the first best even if investments are strict substitutes. Hence, this financing mode may strictly dominate internal financing for v ab (·) < 0. See also footnote 14.
Renegotiation
In our discussion of section 3, we found that the relationship between A and B yields an efficient outcome if renegotiation is infeasible after A expended his effort. It is now interesting to ask whether under which conditions this positive outcome extends to a scenario where renegotiation is allowed for. We obtain the following result. 
Otherwise, A underinvests and a first-best outcome cannot be implemented. 
where γ A is A's Nash bargaining parameter in trilateral renegotiations with A and
B. Otherwise, A underinvests under external financing.
Proof: see the Appendix.
In a setting where A is not wealth constrained, our previous findings continue to apply if renegotiation is admitted. In fact, Proposition 4(a) is a straightforward extension of results in Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) . Even if renegotiation is feasible, B can always insist on a repayment so that her overall equilibrium utility cannot fall below 16 To see that defection can indeed arise under internal financing, consider a situation wherẽ b(a F B , R) > 0 (e.g., the Cobb-Douglas value function). Sinceb(·) decreases in a, the maximizer of the right-hand side of (C3) must be strictly smaller than a F B for any γ ≤ 1. Since (C3) is satisfied with equality for a = a F B and γ = 1, A will thus defect for γ sufficiently close to unity. 17 Recall that B will not invest after observing a < a F B , so that C seizes the asset and obtains a pre-renegotiation payoff v(a, 0) < R C . 18 While we consider Nash bargaining for simplicity, a qualitatively identical result is obtained for more sophisticated bargaining rules as, for instance, the Shapley value. not apply, A does not deviate and a first-best outcome remains feasible. Conversely, if (C4) applies for some a where A is unable to repay his initial loan, a deviation cannot be avoided and the possibility of renegotiation imposes a binding constraint on the feasible outcome.
To further assess these findings, it is interesting to note that (C4) is never satisfied if A's bargaining parameter in trilateral renegotiations with B and C is small. Hence, if γ A is sufficiently smaller than γ because, for instance, the external investor has a strong bargaining position, external financing may facilitate the first best while internal financing does not.
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On the other hand, suppose γ A = γ so that A's bargaining strength in negotiations with B and C is no smaller than under internal financing.
Then, internal financing dominates external financing when renegotiation is admitted:
since B expends no default investment after a deviation under external financing, but exerts a positive default effort under internal financing, the bargaining surplus is strictly smaller in the latter case.
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In addition, the non-deviation payoff in (C4) is strictly larger than in (C3). Taken both effects together, internal financing renders it easier to implement efficient investments if γ A = γ and thus becomes unambiguously preferable in this case.
Finally, we want to argue that a combination of internal and external financing may facilitate the first best if renegotiation is feasible and a single lender triggers a suboptimal outcome. (1994) show that external financing can improve the bargaining position of a client vis-a-vis the researcher (the agent) in a research project, and facilitate an efficient allocation of property rights even if the agent is wealth constrained.
20 In technical terms, we have v(a,
is a necessary condition for a deviation. 21 Joint financing is empirically relevant. For example, the internet broker priceline.com recently announced its plans to expand into Europe [see Priceline Press release, June 28, 2000]. Priceline.com Europe is a new company in which priceline.com and the venture capital fund General Atlantic are investors and jointly fund the company. Under the terms of contract, priceline.com purchases a convertible note allowing the company to take up to a 50% equity stake in priceline.com Europe under certain conditions. Until that note is converted, priceline.com will not hold an equity stake in the new venture. Moreover, for γ A < γ, (C5) is also more demanding than condition (C3). Accordingly,
A will find it less attractive to deviate if B and C jointly finance the initial outlay.
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Conclusion
This paper has analyzed a scenario where two parties A and B sequentially invest in an asset whose setup requires an initial outlay. The model is suited to represent, e.g., the relationship between a start-up firm and a venture capitalist, or between a biotech firm and a pharmaceutical company in a research joint venture. We assume that the idiosyncratic investments of both parties and the final asset value are noncontractible.
In line with existing work, it was shown that an option-to-buy contract generically implements the first best if A is not wealth constrained. This outcome extends to a setting with wealth constrained agent if renegotiation can be prohibited after A expended his effort. In this case, a debt contract between A and either B or an external investor in combination with an option-to-buy contract facilitates efficient investments.
22 The literature has identified a variety of circumstances where multiple lenders can be beneficial. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) show that multiple outside investors can alleviate the problem that a long-term project is stopped prematurely after first-period profits turned out low. Berglöf and von Thadden (1994) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) show that multiple (long-term and short-term) creditors reduce the firm's payoff in renegotiations and accordingly reduce its incentives to default strategically.
The optimal strike price of B's option depends on which of those financing modes is chosen. Under certain conditions, a first best can also be attained if renegotiation is feasible. In general, however, the performance of internal and external financing now differs and we characterize conditions under which one financing form dominates the other. Finally, a combination of internal and external investors may restore an efficient outcome if renegotiation is feasible. Overall, our findings shed some light on the relative performance of internal and external financing in relationships with sequential investments. They also reinforce the by now well received wisdom that option-to-buy arrangements are often a proper tool to govern the incomplete-contracting relationship between parties who invest sequentially, and show how these arrangements should be augmented to account for financing constraints. 
at date 1. We must distinguish between two subcases. If
at date 3 (note that a larger investment is never profitable), she will subsequently exercise her option-to-buy at date 5 because v(a 
Ifb ( . Finally, we show that defection generically occurs if v(a
). In addition, the left-hand side of (C2) converges to zero while the right-hand side is strictly positive. Accordingly, A deviates and underinvestment generically occurs at strike price
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
Consider an option price
and notice thatb(a 
This condition holds with equality if a = a . Since A will never invest more than a . To see that this condition is satisfied, consider the derivative of the left-hand side of (??) with respect to a, which yields (by the implicit function theorem) at date 3 so that renegotiation does not arise. Also, A will never invest less than a
F B
because B can assure herself a continuation payoff R by not investing and insisting on the repayment at date 5, and because date-2 renegotiations will only raise this payoff.
Since A reaps S(a 
